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Abstract
Android malware is a well-known challenging problem and many researchers / vendors / practitioners have tried to
address this issue through application analysis techniques. In order to analyze Android applications, tools decompress
APK files and extract relevant data from the Dalvik EXecutable (DEX) files. To acquire the data, investigators either
use decompiled intermediate code generated by existing tools, e.g., Baksmali or Dex2jar or write their own parsers
/ dissemblers. Thus, they either need additional time because of decompiling the application into an intermediate
representation and then parsing text files, or they reinvent the wheel by implementing their own parsers. In this article,
we present Rapid Android Parser for Investigating DEX files (RAPID) which is an open source and easy-to-use JAVA
library for parsing DEX files. RAPID comes with well-documented APIs which allow users to query data directly from
the DEX binary files. Our experiments reveal that RAPID outperforms existing approaches in terms of runtime efficiency,
provides better reliability (does not crash) and can support dynamic analysis by finding critical offsets. Notably, the
processing time for our sample set of 22.35 GB was only 1.5 hours with RAPID while the traditional approaches needed
about 23 hours (parsing and querying).
Keywords: Android malware, Decompiler, smali code / Baksmali, Parsing Android applications, Dalvik EXecutable,
DEX.
1. Introduction
With the wide adoption of the Android operating sys-
tem, the number of Android applications on Google Play,
the official Android Application market, is estimated to
be over 1.5 million, a number which has steadily increased
over the last ten years1. Complimenting this growth has
been a stark increase in security threats attributed to An-
droid applications.
An Android application is a single file in the Android
Application Package (APK) format which is a compressed
container (a zip file). Within that container, one may
find (1) AndroidManifest.xml which holds essential data
about the application that the Android system must read
before it can run its code (2) at least one Android Virtual
Machine Dalvik EXecutable (DEX) file which is the ac-
tual compiled application (we introduce its layout in Sec.
2) and (3) additional data / resources like images, libraries,
etc.
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Email addresses: xiaoluzhang1985@gmail.com (Xiaolu
Zhang), FBreitinger@newhaven.edu (Frank Breitinger),
IBaggili@newhaven.edu (Ibrahim Baggili)
URL: http://www.FBreitinger.de/ (Frank Breitinger),
http://www.unhcfreg.com/ (Ibrahim Baggili)
1http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps
(last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
At the time of writing this paper, there were four com-
mon procedures for analyzing DEX files:
Smali: The most common procedure was to disassemble
a DEX file into smali code2 which is based on Jasmin
syntax3 and is usually saved in text format. Next,
these text files (one per class) can be parsed and aid
in further analysis.
DEX2JAVA: The second possibility was converting
DEX files into JAVA bytecode which results in either
a .jar file or several .class files. This allows utiliz-
ing already existing tools for JAVA bytecode analysis.
Manual analysis: While the first two approaches are au-
tomated, a third method is to employ an interactive
tool (a debugger or dissassembler like IDA Pro) and
work directly on the DEX file.
Individual solutions: Some researchers implemented
their own standalone programs for parsing / disassem-
bling Android applications. This is discussed further
in Sec. 3.
2Smali code is a human-readable representation for Dalvik byte-
code.
3http://jasmin.sourceforge.net/guide.html (last accessed
Dec. 6, 2015).
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While the aforementioned procedures are currently com-
mon, there are several disadvantages (depending on the
procedure): (i) one has to be familiar with the smali syn-
tax (ii) The first two procedures employ an intermediate
format which is time consuming and requires more disk
space (iii) the conversion from DEX to JAVA is not reli-
able and several applications cannot be converted causing
converters to crash (iv) the offset / location of the data ex-
tracted from the intermediate file(s) is difficult to acquire
from a forensic examiners’ perspective since the interme-
diate representation cannot explicitly link where it is ac-
quired from in a DEX file and (v) the ‘manual’ procedure
is only appropriate for a small number of applications as
it requires a practitioner to manually extract and analyze
relevant data.
Given these limitations, this paper presents Rapid An-
droid Parser for Investigating DEX files (RAPID), an open
source tool for DEX file analysis that is efficient (run-
time), can handle large amounts of data, and is easy-to-use
for forensic practitioners due to its well-documented APIs
(Github plus javadoc).
The performance improvement in our method is gained
by directly working on the DEX files. Furthermore, the de-
vised RAPID approach does not require additional storage
space. Lastly, examiners do not have to be familiar with
any intermediate syntax (e.g., smali). In case an applica-
tion requires additional, manual inspection, RAPID pro-
vides the exact offset of the data acquired (e.g., where a
string is stored inside the application).
Additionally, there are two other advantages to RAPID.
Primarily, in our experiments, we obtained errors when
decompiling / converting DEX files with traditional tools
which did not happen with RAPID (see Sec. 4.5.2). Sec-
ond, RAPID can support dynamic analysis and guide ex-
aminers to suspicious offsets4 (see Sec. 4.4).
The results show that for our sample set of n = 11, 711
Android applications, 16 applications could not be de-
compiled / converted with existing tools, while RAPID
handled them correctly. Furthermore, for the remaining
11,695 samples with a total DEX file size of 22.35 GB,
RAPID reduces the query time from 1,368 minutes to 88
minutes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2
summarizes the DEX file layout followed by the related
work in Sec. 3. The core of this article is Sec. 4 which
describes the approach, the implementation, some details
about the parsing, the usage including APIs, a special use
case as well as the validation. The Experimental results
section discusses RAPID’s benefits. The last two sections
provide the limitations followed by the conclusions and
future work.
4We can locate external function calls such as native libraries
(*.SO files) or JAVA executable files (DEX, JAR). This technique
can be used to hide / obfuscate code.
2. DEX file layout
The DEX file structure is well-documented on the official
Android Dalvik Executable format page (Google, 2008).
An overview is provided in Fig. 1 where the left side shows
a high-level synopsis similar to the official documentation5.
On the right hand side we present a slightly more detailed
representation of the data section which RAPID utilizes
to parse DEX files.
Figure 1: DEX file layout overview.
A DEX file is made up of several sections where Fig. 1
outlines the most important ones (with respect to appli-
cation analysis). The starting point is usually the header
which provides pointers to the other major sections. Fo-
cusing on the actual content, string ids and string data
contain all the data about strings. ‘String’ here refers
to the parts of operations and definitions which have to
be represented by string labels (e.g., value of string con-
stants, type and class names etc.). The method ids section
contains indexes leading to data related to methods, e.g.,
which class they belong to, method names, type of param-
eters etc. The code section comprises all code instructions
divided by code blocks referring to the methods defined in
a DEX file. More details are presented in Sec. 4.2 where
parsing is elaborated on.
3. Related work
The introduction including Sec. 2 briefly outlined the
structure and layout of Android applications. In this sec-
tion, we discuss disassemblers followed by work relevant to
APK file analysis.
Commonly, Android applications are investigated by an-
alyzing the AndroidManifest.xml, the DEX file or both
(Talha et al., 2015). The XML-file processing is straight-
forward – convert binary into text and parse it. Since
XML-files are usually small in size, this process is quite
5https://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/
dex-format.html#file-layout (last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
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Table 1: Works regarding to DEX file analysis.
Tool Description Utilization
Smali
l ApkTool*,6 decompiles APK file Wu et al. (2012), Zheng et al. (2012),
Hoffmann et al. (2013)
2 Baksmali*,7 disassembles DEX file to smali files Zhou et al. (2012), Lu et al. (2012)
DEX2JAVA
3 Dex2jar*,8 converts DEX file to JAR file Gibler et al. (2012)
4 Ded*,9 converts DEX file to .class files Yang et al. (2013)
5 Dare*,10 converts DEX file to .class files Elish et al. (2015)
Manual analysis
6 Androguard*,11 reverse engineering APK file Desnos & Gueguen (2011)
7 IDA Pro12 reverse engineering a wide range of binaries Drake et al. (2014)
8 JEB13 reverse engineering APK file Dmitrienko et al. (2014)
Individual solution
9 AIS disassembles DEX file to smali code Zheng et al. (2013)
10 Own tool converts DEX file to JAVA bytecode Chen et al. (2013)
11 Own parser parses DEX file for APIs and strings Arp et al. (2014)
12 Dedexer*,14 disassembles DEX file to its own format Chin et al. (2011), Seo et al. (2014)
* These tools are open source tools under different licenses, e.g., Apache 2.0, GPLv2, BSD 3-Clause, etc.
For more details, please visit their own website.
easy and efficient. However, a DEX file is more challeng-
ing as it can be larger in comparison.
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently 12
tools for analyzing DEX files. An overview of these tools
is presented in Table 1 with the name of each tool including
a link to their websites. The third column contains a short
description followed by some literature that utilizes each
of the mentioned tools.
Rows 1-2 show works that decompile the DEX file into
smali code using Baksmali or ApkTool. Smali / Baksmali
is a prominent assembler / disassembler for DEX files that
outputs smali code. A positive aspect of this technique
is that it fully supports the DEX format and also allows
one to extract annotations, debugging information, and
line numbers. The second open source tool, ApkTool, is a
Smali / Baksmali decompiler/compiler for Android APK
files. ApkTool has the ability to debug smali code step
by step, and can build a language pack by translating the
.xml strings inside APK files. While these tools are widely
adopted, they come with a major downside of converting
the binary code into smali code which is time consuming.
Rows 3-5 present the DEX2JAVA applications. Dex2jar,
ded and dare (note, dare is the successor of ded) can con-
vert the DEX files into JAVA bytecode (.jar, .class) and
thus they convert from binary into binary (Enck et al.,
6https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
7https://code.google.com/p/smali/
8http://sourceforge.net/projects/dex2jar/
9http://siis.cse.psu.edu/ded/
10http://siis.cse.psu.edu/dare/index.html
11https://code.google.com/archive/p/androguard/
12https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/
13https://www.pnfsoftware.com/
14http://sourceforge.net/projects/dedexer/
2011). The benefit of this conversion is that there are
already several existing tools for JAVA bytecode analysis
which may then be utilized, e.g., Soot15, Jad16 and JD-
GUI17. Note, these tools can be used to process JAR files
and therefore are not listed in Table 1 nor are they dis-
cussed. Notwithstanding, even though DEX2JAVA tools
offer speed efficiency due to intermediate representation,
Castillo et al. (2011) points out that the DEX2JAVA con-
version is not reliable and often fails. For example, Yang
et al. (2013) indicated that 42 out of 1,750 samples resulted
in a failure during their work using ded.
Rows 9-11 exemplify tools in the ‘manual’ category. An-
droguard allows decompiling and disassembling Android
applications and is helpful when manually analyzing ap-
plications (Desnos, 2013). It is also a toolset for reverse
engineering Android applications with the goal of mali-
cious application detection, built into Santoku Linux18.
On the other hand, one may use more general tools like
IDA Pro which is a commercial tool for Windows, Linux
and Mac OS X for application analysis. It is a multi-
processor disassembler and debugger that offers many fea-
tures, and can provide safe analysis of potentially harmful
programs (Hex-Rays, 2005). Incidentally, JEB is another
commercial interactive decompiler that is able to process
multiple APK files to smali or JAVA source consecutively.
Rows 12-15 summarize works having an intermediate
phase that implemented their own disassembler / parser
that may generate a non-standard intermediate format.
15http://sable.github.io/soot/ (last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
16http://varaneckas.com/jad/ (last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
17https://github.com/java-decompiler/jd-gui (last accessed
Dec. 6, 2015).
18https://santoku-linux.com (last accessed Dec. 6, 2015).
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While this may be efficient as it is optimized for a specific
purpose, it also means that researchers and practitioners
reinvent the wheel as they have to develop a variety of
parsers to acquire data from Android applications.
4. RAPID approach
As shown by our literature review, most works are based
on gaining access to the data in APK files, and more im-
portantly in DEX files. It is therefore critical for future
work to adopt a more efficient, standardized, optimized
and accurate approach for acquiring desired data from
DEX files. Our solution to this problem is RAPID. This
in-memory solution hinges on three major steps:
Decompress: APK files equal zip files and thus the
first required step is decompression which reveals
the DEX files as well as the AndroidManifest.xml
file. While DEX files serve as input for RAPID,
AndroidManifest.xml is only converted into human
readable text and is currently not required by RAPID.
Load DEX files: After decompressing, the data is pulled
from the DEX files and is loaded into an internal
data structure which consists of four main compo-
nents: string, method, codeBlock and instruction. All
queries and further processing are performed on this
internal structure which resides in memory. More de-
tails on the internal data structure as well as the pars-
ing are discussed in Sec. 4.1 and Sec. 4.2 respectively.
Query: Once the in-memory data structure is prepared,
RAPID allows different query types (based on the
components). For instance, investigators can look for
a specific ‘string’, ‘method-name’, ‘used APIs’ or even
‘find the exact offset in the code’. A detailed expla-
nation of what data the queries in RAPID is able to
return can be found in Sec. 4.1.
4.1. Implementation
Our JAVA prototype implementation is open source
and can be downloaded from https://github.com/
unhcfreg/RAPID. RAPID comes in a form of a library
(i.e., a JAR file), a sample.java which demonstrates some
use cases with detailed documentation (generated with
javadoc). Note, RAPID was compiled with JAVA 7 and
thus requires JRE 7 or higher.
The implementation consists of four main components
– string, method, codeBlock and instruction – where each
component contains corresponding objects. For instance,
the method component includes a list of method objects
(one per method). The structure of each object, which
are also the searchable fields is outlined in Table 2; a brief
summary is provided in the following paragraphs (parsing
level is described at the end of Sec. 4.2):
String objects represent all strings that exist in the ap-
plication and delineates the string data section from
the DEX file. This includes values in string vari-
ables, function / class names and function return val-
ues (e.g., void, int).
Method objects contain the data about specific meth-
ods. For instance, a method object knows its name,
the class it belongs to, number and types of parame-
ters and the return value (e.g., void) and associated
executable code19.
CodeBlock objects link the methods to the ac-
tual instructions (bytecode). Therefore, a
codeBlock has a start address (offset), end
address (offset) and an instruction list (e.g.,
string-const v0 "Hello World" etc.).
Instruction objects embody the actual code that is ex-
ecuted and are necessary for flow analysis. For in-
stance, it allows one to locate where specific methods
were called from.
Note, method, codeBlock and instruction are linked to
each other (methodId and the ArrayList<Instruction>)
whereas the strings are duplicated and also stored in the
corresponding objects, e.g., methodName can be found in
a method object as well as in the string component. This
was implemented for performance reasons.
4.2. Parsing a DEX file
Parsing the DEX file is a complex task as it involves
running through the bytecode and selecting relevant data.
This section provides a short overview of the parsing pro-
cess.
Although the DEX file format is well described by the
Google (2008) documentation, we decided to include this
overview as digital forensic practitioners and researchers
continue to face issues in malware investigations due to
the lack of the ability of tracing certain data by traversing
contents of a DEX file.
Fig. 2 provides an overview of the complete parsing pro-
cedure and is explained in the subsequent paragraphs. As
stated in Sec. 2, the starting point is the header which
contains pointers to the main sections.
First, the stringObjects are built where RAPID
parses string ids and then reads the data (1+2). Here,
string ids are pointers to specific strings. Second, RAPID
works on the methodObjects where it starts at the
method ids (3) which allows it to acquire the method name
from string data (4+5). Note, since string data is already
parsed, we can retrieve this data from our stringObjects.
Next, RAPID reads the ‘string ID for the class name’
from type ids which is then used to get the actual class
19Note, some values (e.g., void) are redundant and can be found
in string objects as well as in method objects. We decided for that
due to the performance increase.
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Table 2: Summary of the main components and their attributes.
Type Field Description
String object (StringElement.java) Parsing Level 1
int stringId index of the string from string ids
long address offset pointing to the string content in the DEX file
String stringContent the string itself
long stringLength length of the string
Method object (MethodElement.java) Parsing Level 2
int methodId index of the method from method ids
long address offset pointing to the meta data of the method (in method ids)
String className class name as string where the method belongs to
String methodName name of the method name
String[] parameterType type(s) of the parameter(s) of the method
String returnValueType type of the return value
boolean hasCodeBlock* true if the method is implemented in DEX file
CodeBlock codeBlock* pointer of the codeBlock
CodeBlock object (CodeBlock.java) Parsing Level 3
int codeBlockId index number of the code block to link it to a method
long startAddress start offset of the code block in DEX file
long endAddress end offset of the code block in DEX file
int methodId index of the method the code block belongs to
ArrayList <Instruction> instructionList* list of pointers to instructions
Instruction object (Instruction.java) Parsing Level 4
int instructionId index number of instruction to link it to the CodeBlock
int codeBlockId index number of the code block the instruction belongs to
long address offset of the instruction in DEX file
boolean hasOperand true if an instruction has an operand
boolean hasRegister true if an instruction has register(s)
int length length of instruction in bytes
int op hex value of the opcode
String opcode general name for same type of mnemonics
String opcodeSuffix specific mnemonic of opcode
long operand value of the operand
String operandSuffix explanation of operand value
int[] registerList list of registers
* are special fields which fall into the next parsing level, e.g., hasCodeBlock is an attribute of the method object,
NULL for parsing level 2 and will be filled in parsing level 3.
name as a string (6-8). proto ids contains two IDs – the
return value ID and the pointer for the parameter list of
the method. Hence, RAPID acquires the return type from
type ids and resolves it further into a string (10-12). Fur-
thermore, it analyzes the type list which contains data
about the number of parameters as well as the all param-
eter types (13). The type ids can be matched to names by
parsing the corresponding sections (14-16).
Having the string and method object in memory, the
final steps focus on creating the codeObjects which is
executed by parsing steps 17-20. Note, instructions are
part of the codeObjects. Star -* is representative of all
instructions as presented in Table 220.
This parsing procedure allows for different parsing levels
(see Table 2). That is, only required sections are parsed
where lower levels always need to be parsed first. For in-
stance, if the analysis only requires a string search, RAPID
only creates the stringObjects, i.e., parsing level 1. If the
search involves parts from the methodObjects, RAPID
parses levels 1 and 2.
20The actual parsing for * is complex and explaining it in detail
is beyond the scope of this paper. We plan on publishing a technical
report that outlines the exact procedure.
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Figure 2: Overview of the parsing procedure.
4.3. Usage
This section provides step by step instructions on how
to install and run RAPID. It is meant to ease the usage
process for potential practitioners.
Step1: Ensure that JAVA Development Kit (JDK) 1.7 or
higher is installed.
Step2: Download the RAPID JAR library, sample.java as
well as sample APK files and store them in the same
directory. By default, the code will analyze all APKs
that are in the same directory.
Step3: Compile the sample.java file in the system termi-
nal by using the following command:
javac -cp RAPIDv0.2.jar sample.java.
Step4: Execute the sample.class file with the command
java -cp .;RAPIDv0.2.jar sample (on Windows)
java -cp .:RAPIDv0.2.jar sample (on *nix).
The output of the sample file presents a general overview
of the DEX files such as the total number of strings, meth-
ods and APIs used in the application. Additionally, it
prints the first 20 strings in the string component and the
first 20 APIs with their basic data such as class and func-
tion name, address etc. Next, we chose a known JAVA
API: java.lang.System.load(..) to test for its exis-
tence. If the result is (true), all the instructions invok-
ing the API will be printed, of which the most important
data is the address(es) where the API was invoked in the
DEX file. Furthermore, the methods and the details of the
codeBlock, where the instructions executed will be listed
as well.
In total, RAPID v0.2 currently provides 27 APIs which
are listed Appendix A including a short description for
each one. These 27 APIs can be divided into four cat-
egories. The four ‘setting’-APIs allow for initializing
RAPID, e.g., setting the source directory of the APK sam-
ples. The second set of APIs contain the three ‘main ob-
ject queries’; functions of RAPID which return lists of the
three main objects of the internal data structure: String,
method and codeBlock (see Sec. 4.2). The third set of
APIs allow for specific queries against the complete data
structure. A user can search for the existence of of a string,
method or API, or acquire a list of all classes. Those APIs
are summarized in the ‘search operations’ section.
The last set ‘Workflow analyses functions’ include func-
tionality to further inspect a given DEX file.
For instance, getMethodInvoker(..) can back trace
the methods invoking a specific function as well as
getExternalFilesDirs() can obtain where the external
files are located.
The decision for these APIs was driven by existing liter-
ature; we analyzed what features / functions are required
by existing tools and implemented those. For example, the
malware detection concepts proposed by Wu et al. (2012)
and Peiravian & Zhu (2013) utilize API calls only as their
features, thus RAPID provides a method getApiList().
A detailed discussion about all of the APIs is beyond the
scope of this article. For more details, readers may want to
explore the documentation which comes with the RAPID
library.
Although these 27 APIs allow access to most of the data
stored within the data structure, there might be scenarios
where different outputs are required. In that case one may
have to implement their own logic and use the existing
‘getter-’methods of the different objects.
4.4. Use case: finding outsourced functionality
A common problem when analyzing applications is out-
sourced code; developers have the option to place code /
functionality in files other than the main DEX file. For
instance, placing API calls or other functionality exter-
nally is sometimes used for obfuscation (Apvrille & Nigam,
2014). Thus, for investigative purposes, it is of interest to
know if external files are being loaded.
External files and calls. There are two ways for an An-
droid application to load code from external files, static
and dynamic. The static method imports libraries or Java
Archive (JAR) files into the program before the APK file
is compiled. On the other hand, the dynamic procedure
calls the external files / functions during runtime. Since
static can be easily identified by checking the application’s
directory, we focus on dynamic loading.
In general, applications can load two types of external
files: *.SO files or JAR / DEX files. SO files are native
libraries following the Java Native Interface (JNI) stan-
dards which are developed by the Native Development Kit
(NDK) and are usually written in C or C++.
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JAVA provides four different APIs to load content dy-
namically. load(..) and loadLibrary(..) from class
java.lang.System can load native libraries while the
constructor of class dalvik.system.DexClassLoader and
dalvik.system.PathClassLoader21 are utilized for load-
ing classes from DEX or JAR files.
The search process. Determining if an application calls
any code from external files requires searching for the four
APIs in the main DEX file. The procedure is generally
divided into three steps:
Step1: Search if one of the APIs is invoked in a DEX file
which can be performed by analyzing the instruction
objects (in RAPID) or examining if it is part of a
function.
Step2: Next, once the API is identified, the parameters
are analyzed to explore whether we can figure out the
library or the path to the library. For instance, if a
library is dynamically loaded, it might be the case
that the string already exists in the DEX file. If the
string cannot be found, then we continue to step 3.
Step3: Obviously our approach does not perform dy-
namic analysis, however, this procedure provides the
exact address of the invoke and thus a researcher or
practitioner can use the acquired address and set the
‘break point’ during dynamic analysis.
To simplify this process, RAPID provides two APIs.
The areExternalFilesLoaded() is a boolean function to
test weather one of those four APIs was found. The second
function name getExternalFilesDirs() returns a list of
<key,value> objects where key is the address of an invoke
and value is the actual name of the loaded lib / file. An
example of the output of this function is shown below.
176088--->
176032--->
229790--->/system/lib/libandroid.so
The output shown means that three offsets were found in
the DEX file, where only in the last case the loaded library
and its path was located. In the other two cases the value
of the parameter for the path of the .SO file could not be
obtained. This could be due to various reasons such as a
path parameter for the .SO file being split into different
string variables. However, we note that our method still
returns the address of each API used to call external files.
4.5. Validation and reliability of RAPID
This section briefly describes how validation of RAPID
was examined (Sec. 4.5.1) as well as how the reliability of
RAPID was tested (Sec. 4.5.2).
21The difference is that PathClassLoader is unable to load the
zipped DEX file.
Both tests were conducted on 11,711 APK files where
1,260 were malicious samples from the Android Malware
Genome Project22 (Zhou & Jiang, 2012) and 10,451 free
applications considered as benign samples downloaded
from Google Play. These collected samples cover most
of the categories available in the store, i.e., we cover 24/27
of the main/application categories and 17/17 of the games
category23. All samples were downloaded starting at the
end of 2015 and the last update was performed in Jan-
uary, 2016. The popularity of the applications ranged from
less than 1000 downloads to prominent applications with
millions of downloads like Facebook or YouTube. We de-
cided to use malware and benign samples in our testing as
(i) practitioners are usually tasked with malware analysis
and thus analyzing Android malware is a highly probable
use-case and (ii) we were not sure if malware and benign
samples differed significantly, which could lead to poten-
tial RAPID errors – our goal was to have diverse Android
application coverage in order generalize the validity and
reliability of our approach.
4.5.1. Validation
To validate RAPID, we performed cross-comparison to
the data in smali files generated by Baksmali, which in-
cluded three tests for the string object, method object
and codeBlock / instruction object. All three yielded the
same results verifying the correctness of our approach. The
first two tests (string and method component) were imple-
mented by an automatic comparison and was based on
11,705 samples (6 samples could not be decompiled using
Baksmali (see Sec. 4.5.2). The third test was more com-
plex and required manual analysis.
Strings. For this test, we extracted all strings with RAPID
as well as from the smali files and ran a cross-comparison.
All RAPID strings were found in the smali files and vice
versa. Note that the same string may be represented dif-
ferently in DEX and smali files, e.g., the symbol ‘’’ is
represented as ‘\’’ (additional backslash) in smali code as
it is a reserved symbol by smali. Our comparison script
considered those situations.
Classes and methods. This test focused on method-related
data which included the elements that can represent an
independent method; method name, class name, type of
return value and parameter type. For this purpose our
prototype extracted the relevant data from the smali code
using regular expressions and utilized our method compo-
nent. A cross comparison showed that both results coin-
cided.
22http://www.malgenomeproject.org (last accessed Dec. 6,
2015).
23The categories are listed at https://play.google.com/store/
apps and then click on ‘Categories’ which is found close the left upper
corner of the screen.
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CodeBlocks and instructions. The last test was rather
complex and therefore conducted manually. The problem
is that Baksmali includes additional strings / symbols to
ease readability which are not part of the original DEX
file. To achieve this automatically, it would be necessary
to also add these strings which would then correspond to
Baksmali code. For instance, the decompiler adds .method
to indicate the start of a method. As a result, we could not
find any differences between Baksmali and RAPID within
the 20 codeBlocks that were tested manually.
4.5.2. Reliability
For this test, we compared the reliability of RAPID
again to other prominent approaches – Baksmali and
Dex2jar (due to the complexity of the test and the avail-
ability of the tools, testing all the tools is outside the scope
of our work). The test is successful if the smali code or
the JAR file are generated without errors by Baksmali or
Dex2jar, respectively. For RAPID, we required that all
four parsing levels were executed.
While RAPID successfully parsed all applications, Baks-
mali as well as Dex2jar failed to process several of them.
In detail, Baksmali failed on six applications (error mes-
sages were printed and no smali files were generated) and
Dex2jar failed on 10 cases to generate a JAR file or the
JAR file was corrupt. Surprisingly, all these applications
were benign.
The reasons of resulting in such failures varied. In order
to be successful, Baksmali and Dex2jar need valid program
logic throughout the DEX file. That means, if they parse
segments containing errors, exceptions will be thrown and
the parser stops (even though the code is never executed).
On the contrary, RAPID, as a direct extraction approach,
was still able to acquire data from the DEX files on those
samples that failed to process.
5. Experimental results
As discussed in the related work, tools either decompile
or convert the binary code and then work on the smali code
/ JAVA bytecode or implement their own parser to extract
the data. Since we cannot compare each individual parser,
we only focus on comparing RAPID with smali code and
JAVA bytecode (which are the most commonly adopted
procedures).
The total runtime T of an approach A ∈
{RAPID,Baksmali,Dex2jar} for m different queries on
a single application can be calculated as follows:
TA = Tunzip + T
A
prep + m · TAquery (1)
where Tunzip is the time to unzip / decompress the APK
file, Tprep is the preparation time (decomiling or parsing)
and Tquery is the average time per query.
Since Tunzip is independent of the actual approach, we
neglect it and separate the efficiency experiment into two
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Figure 3: Regression coefficients for decompiling and parsing for
11,695 applications.
sections. First, we analyze Tprep which compares the de-
compiling of the approaches in Sec. 5.1. In the subsequent
section, Tquery is analyzed which is the query-time.
The experiments were conducted on an machine with In-
tel (R) Core (TM) I7-4770S 3.1 GHz CPU, 16 GB memory
and Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 64bit.
5.1. Decompiling vs parsing
As discussed in Sec. 4.2, RAPID has different parsing
levels and hence the runtime depends on the actual data
that is queried. For this test, we measured the runtime for
all the four different parsing levels as well as the smali de-
compilation time and the JAVA bytecode conversion time.
We utilized the sample set introduced in Sec. 4.5 but
excluded the 16 files that couldn’t be processed by Dex2jar
or Baksmali. Thus, the upcoming tests were conducted on
11,695 samples.
First, we decompressed all the APK files by running a
self-implemented JAVA program. Next, we ran Baksmali
as well as Dex2jar on the sample set and measured the ex-
ecution time using a JAVA API. With respect to RAPID,
four separate tests were conducted – one per parsing level.
Recall, the higher parsing levels include parsing lower lev-
els and thus the time will increase.
The test results are shown in Fig. 3 and clearly demon-
strate the performance advantage of RAPID compared to
its counterparts. The total runtime and the regression co-
efficients for each test are provided in Table 3. As shown,
the time for Baksmali and Dex2jar are in the same order
of magnitude where Dex2jar is insignificantly faster than
Baksmali.
5.2. Querying data
This second test focused on queries. Note, for this test
we only focused on Baksmali and RAPID as parsing the
JAVA byte structure is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 4: Times for the smali code searches in seconds.
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Figure 5: Times for the RAPID searches in seconds.
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Figure 7: Linear regression for the RAPID searches.
Table 3: Regression coefficients for the different Parsing Levels (PL)s
for RAPID as well as the Baksmali and Dex2jar.
Regression coefficients (s⁄MB) Time (min)
Baksmali 2.43 890.27
Dex2jar 1.91 704.34
PL 1 0.13 44.50
PL 2 0.19 64.07
PL 3 0.20 67.73
PL 4 0.26 88.05
However, it is assumed that parsing the JAVA binary files
will be similar to parsing the DEX file (both are binary)
and thus similar to RAPID.
As will be shown, the query time very much depends
on the actual use case and can be very slow for decom-
piled files. For instance, searching for a single string is
less complex than retrieving the class where a method is
called or analyzing the invokes from / to a specific func-
tion. Therefore, we conducted the test on the previously
decompressed 11,695 DEX files. For testing purposes, we
devised 3 different use cases / scenarios and measured the
time; string search, API search and invoke search.
String search. In the first scenario, we only searched for
a specific string. Real world applications of this is if an
investigator searches for a specific URL or name. In this
scenario we searched for ‘http://’.
For RAPID this meant we only had to construct the
string component which is parsing level 1 and run through
the linear list. With respect to the smali code, we have to
execute a string search on all the decompiled files.
API search. In the second scenario, we looked for
the usage of the ‘loadLibrary(..)’ API in class
java.lang.System. For smali code this is similar to a
plain string search. Note, although usually more pars-
ing is required (e.g., to analyze the parameters and return
value), in this test we focused on finding the API only.
With respect to RAPID we can utilize the method com-
ponent (parsing level 2) to solve this challenge.
Invoke search. The last scenario was the most complex
as we aimed at finding the methods that invoke a specific
function, i.e., which method / class calls a specific func-
tion. In the case of the smali code search, we looked for
the function (string search) and then analyzed if this was
part of the function and read the class name. RAPID will
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Table 4: Regression coefficients for the different searches.
Regression coefficients (s⁄MB) Time
Baksmali
string search 1.36 467.66 min
API search 1.37 484.46 min
invoke search 1.41 481.34 min
RAPID
string search 5.138e-04 14.16 s
API search 2.760e-04 7.83 s
invoke search 6.458e-04 13.35 s
have to parse all four levels and then start from the in-
struction object by finding the opcode == invoke24; from
there it goes upwards to the codeBlock where a specific in-
struction object is contained which reveals the methodId.
Results. The results for the different searches (smali
queries and RAPID queries) are shown in Fig. 4-7. Note,
times are in seconds but the scale is different.
Fig. 4 and 5 show the exact results obtained from both
approaches. Focusing on the smali code searches shows
that they are similar in time and there are only a few
outliers (see Fig. 4). With respect to RAPID, the behavior
is quite different. While API / string search behave in
a stable manner, there are significant differences for the
invoke search which result from the fact that some APIs
are found (slower; points on upper part of the graph) and
others are not found. More precisely, in case an API is not
found in the application, the algorithm can immediately
stop. On the other hand, if the API is found, RAPID then
needs to find the invoke which requires more time.
Fig. 6 and 7 show the linear regression obtained from
both approaches which could be used to estimate times
for different sample sets.
Analyzing the linear regression in more detail reveals the
regression coefficients as summarized in Table 4. These co-
efficients allowed us to upscale the results for larger sample
sizes.
5.3. Results summary
The previous two sections addressed the processing steps
separately. In order to explore the overall performance
improvement, this section considers the initial Eq. 1 where
we will set m = 1 queries, neglect the unzip time Tunzip =
0 and use the average search times from Table 4. Thus, for
the sample set of n = 11, 695 which equals 22,889.64 MB,
the total time for Baksmali is
TBaksmali = Tunzip + T
A
prep + m · TAquery
= 0 + 890.27min + 1 · 477.82min
≈ 1, 368min
24Note, this is simplified for a better understanding, the actual
opcode we are searching is invoke-kind.
and for RAPID it is
TRAPID = Tunzip + T
A
prep + m · TAquery
= 0 + 88.05min + 1 · 0.20min
≈ 88min
Note that the p-values25 for all the regression coefficients
are significantly less than 0.01.
6. Limitations
There are four limitations with the current version of
RAPID.
First, as shown in Sec. 4.2, we currently do not parse the
complete DEX file and ignore some parts, e.g., sections
containing debugging or annotation information (even
though they can still be found as scattered strings in the
string component). Although our literature review re-
vealed that this data is typically not used, there might
be approaches in the future that require this information.
Second, a user needs to get accustomed to the fact that
RAPID does not provide a ‘class-object’ as a main com-
ponent but focuses on strings, methods and codeBlocks.
Users can only retrieve the class data by accessing the
class name field of the corresponding method objects.
Third, given the fact that there are currently over 1.5
million applications on market, the test sample size with
a little bit over 11,000 files may be considered small.
Finally, although we had some malware samples, we did
not experiment with obfuscation and code protection tech-
niques and how RAPID’s results might change. For exam-
ple, it may be possible that current techniques may crash
RAPID but pass the validity check of the Android virtual
machine.
7. Conclusion and future work
The problem we tried to solve is that current APK anal-
ysis approaches mostly convert the DEX file into interme-
diate code (e.g., JAVA code, smali code) which is then
analyzed or used. This procedure has a significant draw-
back when it comes to runtime efficiency as one first has
to convert everything and then analyze it.
For researchers and practitioners that might have imple-
mented their proprietary DEX parsers for certain Android
application analysis work, this means that future work will
have to reinvent the wheel since that code is often not be-
ing validated and / or shared.
Our idea was to create an easy-to-use library that can
be utilized to analyze DEX files. As a result, we presented
a new library titled RAPID – a Rapid Android Parser for
25p-value can reject the null hypothesis that the slope of the re-
gression line is equal to zero if it is less than the significance levels
which researchers always choose 0.01 / 0.05.
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Investigating DEX files – that directly works on DEX files.
In other words, instead of converting the data, we directly
extract it.
RAPID is well-documented and comes with multiple
APIs that can be utilized by others. As our library is
open source and freely available, users can extend it. Our
experimental results show the significant performance im-
provement one can gain using RAPID. Furthermore, we
offer the possibility for searching for dynamic loading of
libraries which can then support dynamic analysis.
In the future, we will embark on three major steps.
First, we want to collect feedback from users regarding the
APIs and eventually change or improve the existing set of
APIs. Second, we will analyze our code for possible further
improvements. Third, we would like to enable RAPID to
perform more complex tasks like data-flow or call graph
analysis. These can be realized by complex queries which
RAPID can handle in a reasonable amount of time.
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Appendix A. API summary
Table A.5: RAPID APIs including brief descriptions.
Method Description
Settings
setApkDir(String apkDir) Sets the directory containing the APK / DEX files.
setSingleApk(String apkDir) To analyze a single APK / DEX file.
setUnzippedFileDir(String unzippedFileDir) Sets temp-directory for the unzipped DEX files.
getApkList() Returns a list of all APK files found in the set-directory.
Main object queries (per APK / DEX file)
getStringList() Returns a list of string objects parsed out of the current file.
getMethodList() Returns a list of method objects parsed out of the current file.
getCodeBlockList() Returns a list of codeBlock objects parsed out of the current file.
Search operations
doesStringExist(String keyword) Returns true if ‘keyword’ is found in DEX file.
doesMethodExist(MethodElement method) Returns true if a method exists in DEX file.
doesApiExist(MethodElement api) Returns true if an API call exists in a DEX file.
getApiList() Returns a list of all utilized APIs in a DEX file.
getClassList() Returns a list of class names in DEX file.
getCodeBlockById(int methodId) Returns the codeBlock of a method according to methodId.
searchStringContaines(String keyword) Search ‘keyword’ and returns a list of string objects.
searchMethod(MethodElement method) Returns a list of methodElements (e.g, useful for overloaded methods).
searchInstruction(Instruction[] targetIns) Return a list of instructions objects.
searchInstruction(String opcode, long operand) Return a list of instructions objects with same opcode and operand.
searchInsWithOpc(String opcode) Return a list of instructions objects with same opcode.
searchInsWithString(String stringContent) Return a list of instructions objects where a string is assigned.
searchInsWithString(StringElement string) Same than before but search a string object.
Workflow analyses functions
isMethodInvoked(MethodElement Method) If a method is invoked / called in DEX file.
areExternalFilesloaded() Returns true if any external files are loaded.
getMethodInvolker(MethodElement method) Returns method object list that invokes a specific method.
getExternalFilesDirs() Returns the directories where the external file(s) are located.
getInsInvokeMethod(MethodElement method) Return the instruction objects (as list) that invokes a method.
getInsInvokeMethods(MethodElement[] methods) Same than before but accepts an array of methods.
getInsLoadExternalFiles() Returns a list of instructions that loads external files.
12
